Democratic and Public Accountability
Our understanding of accountability Opens in new window in government and public law has changed as the effect of two concomitant processes, concerning the quality of democracy Opens in new window and that of public management.
Although the two processes have developed separately (and sometimes in opposite directions), they have had a cumulative effect on the uses of accountability.
At a more political level, the traditional forms of electoral and ministerial accountability have increasingly been regarded as limited instruments for controlling political power and making it responsive to the wishes of the electorate.
Demands for more effective accountability have therefore tended to expand the instruments of political accountability, looking for ways in which political control can be exercised procedurally and in the course of decision making, and not simply ex post facto.
One can observe three tendencies in such a process expansion.
- The first is the importance given to both administrative transparency and citizens’ right of information.
By opening up the process of decision making to the public scrutiny, it is hoped that representatives and public officials will be forced to act in the public interest.
- The second is the introduction of various forms of more direct control or input from the citizens.
Institutions such as the ombudsman, who can act as the direct voice of the individual citizen vis-à-vis the public administration, or the recall of public officials, which approximates to a form of imperative mandate, or the more frequent use of referenda on controversial issues are all ways in which public officials and public decision making in general are supposed to be brought into more immediate contact with the wishes of the citizens.
More generally, the use of public opinion surveys, focus groups, and other forms of deliberative polling, though often intended for partisan purposes, are other ways in which politicians tend to connect with the citizens and consider their views.
- The third avenue taken in the expansion of accountability, particularly as a way of curbing corruption and regulating private interest in public affairs, has been the introduction of stricter standards of conduct and the development of various registers of interests.
Whether the proliferation of such instruments for the regulation of private conduct has in fact achieved the scope of reducing maladministration is not clear, and it may ultimately depend on the cultural context in which regulation operates.
Similarly, the extent to which public officials’ private interests and private life are deemed publicly relevant, and therefore matters of public accountability, varies greatly across both space and time.
The impeachment of President Bill Clinton is a case in point, for his “misdemeanors” may well not have been considered constitutionally relevant in other places and other times.
Changes in administrative culture and practices have arguably been even more important as contributing factors in the transformation of both the concept and the institutions of accountability.
The greatest impact has come from the paradigm shift introduced by the new public management.
Whereas accountability Opens in new window in traditional public administration Opens in new window and administrative law mainly worked procedurally, being concerned with the regular and effective implementation of the substantive policies decided at the political level, the revolution in public management has shifted the emphasis to performance and policy output.
This shift has meant a blurring of the distinction between political and administrative competencies, a distinction that has further been weakened by the way in which policy implementation has become more autonomous from the legislative process in modern complex societies, where social legislation takes a more substantive form.
The new emphasis on the new public management, and on public administration’s capacity to deliver good services to the citizens, has paradoxically inverted the roles of politics and administration in relation to accountability.
Whereas political accountability has become more procedural, administrative accountability has become more focused on output.
In principle, this has meant a greater autonomy for the public managers in the way in which they organize service provision, but also a greater reliance on a quasi-market form of accountability, where performance is judged, as in the market, by customers’ satisfaction. In truth, however, this is not the whole story.
For assessing performance and customers’ satisfaction in relations to the public sector (which is still meant to provide public goods, even though in the form of privately enjoyed services) is not easy in the absence of standard market indicators such as profit levels, the equilibrium between supply and demand, hard budgets, and so forth.
Hence, accountability has taken the form of a complex series of exogenous indicators of performance and output, such as “targets,” “benchmarks,” and various proxies for consumers’ choice.
Together with the proliferation of performance indicators, there has also been a steady increase in monitoring and audit exercises, which in themselves require considerable effort and have considerable costs. In short, the emphasis on output and quasi-market-based form of accountability has tended to increase, rather than diminish, procedural requirements.
The most evident conceptual innovation of these recent developments in democratic and public accountability is the change from vertical to horizontal conceptions.
Whereas traditional accountability was based on the agent’s obligation to give an account to the principal, and for the latter to judge the agent’s conduct, both democratic and administrative accountability have developed a series of instruments that are meant to produce agent’s accountability independently from the principal’s judgment and action, though ostensibly in the principal’s own interest.
Guillermo O’Donnell, for instance, has introduced the notion of horizontal accountability, as way of describing the operations of checks and balances that various nonmajoritarian institutions perform in democratic systems.
Increasingly, particularly in the literature on democratic transformation, democratic accountability is meant loosely as an aspect of the quality of democracy, deriving not so much from the electoral process and from the protection of individual rights in general, the rule of law, and the probity, openness, and performance of the public sector.